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This paper uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the economic effects of 
bank account debits (BAD) taxation. Australia and various Latin American countries 
have levied or levy BAD taxes. Aspects such as financial disintermediation, market 
illiquidity, and impacts on dividend and interest rates are considered. Part of the 
BAD tax revenue may be fictitious, due to increased interest payments on 
government debt. The Brazilian BAD tax (CPMF) experience is evaluated. The 
empirical analysis confirms some theoretical predictions. Incidence base over GDP 
appears to be sensitive to the tax rate, possibly engendering a Laffer curve. The tax 
may also cause real interest rates to increase. Furthermore, the deadweight losses 
are relatively large, even if revenues are small. The theoretical and empirical results 
suggest that the BAD tax is not adequate for revenue collection. 
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